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Abstract 
Brokerage is an essential yet understudied function in social life. In one of the classics in the field of sociology, Georg 
Simmel differentiated three types of the “third” which help to analyse brokerage: the disinterested mediator or 
arbitrator, tertius gaudens and divide et impera. Studies that conceptualise traffickers and smugglers as brokers are 
extremely rare. Scholars lack a typology which can serve as a basis for comparative research. To advance scholarship on 
brokerage this article seeks to develop a conceptual-typological matrix by setting out to explore three questions: Why 
does brokerage exist? What kind of social mechanism is brokerage? What are the implications of brokerage for social 
inequalities and equalities? The analysis concludes with the consequences of different types of brokerage for the 
(re)production of social inequalities. 
Keywords 
brokerage; inequality; migration; social mechanism 
Issue 
This article is part of a regular issue of Social Inclusion, edited by Professor Ulf R. Hedetoft (University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark). 
© 2014 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 
 
1. Introduction 
Conceptually, reference to ubiquitous migrant networks 
(Gold, 2005), social capital (Massey & Aysa, 2005), or 
migration systems is not sufficient to account for how 
some of the reciprocal relationships between migrants 
and others who offer intermediary or brokerage ser-
vices function. Any analysis in this area should include 
not only migrants and their networks but also (poten-
tial) employers, private individuals, and states (Krissman, 
2005). Mechanismic explanations of these relationships 
have approached the problem by, for example, breaking 
down network effects into the three mechanisms of (1) 
exchange of information, (2) the norm of reciprocity, 
and (3) collective action of migrants (di Maggio & 
Garip, 2012). These are very broad general mecha-
nisms which are of importance in accounting for migra-
tion dynamics. Cutting across at least the first two of 
these mechanisms, if not all three, is brokerage, name-
ly a third party connecting two actors. Network meth-
odology has not systematically considered the figure of 
the “third” in processes of observation, translation, 
mediation, arbitration, rivalry, coalitions, and other el-
ementary configurations of social life. Even less atten-
tion has been paid to the effects brokerage has on exist-
ing patterns of social (in)equality and new (in)equalities 
emerging from migration. Yet it is useful to study bro-
kerage as a sort of glue of social life, and especially in 
the field of migration. This paper offers a conceptual 
sketch for a typology of brokerage in cross-border mi-
gration and outlines how to study the consequences 
brokerage has for social (in)equality. 
Georg Simmel developed the sociology of the triad, 
which allows for three typical groupings of brokers 
which are not possible in dyads. When a third member 
enters a dyadic group consisting of ego and alter, vari-
ous processes which previously could not take place 
then become possible. Simmel observed that the num-
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ber of parties to an interaction can affect its nature 
(Simmel, 1992, pp. 124-150). The “third” is so important 
because it is distinct from the dyad, and adds an ele-
ment which is not present if we simply add a “fourth” 
and a “fifth”. There is a qualitative difference between 
dyads and triads. The interaction between two people, a 
dyad, will be very different from that which is possible in 
a three-party relationship, or triad. This is key: within a 
dyadic relationship, each individual can maintain his or 
her role. When one party to the interaction is no longer 
interested in maintaining it, the relationship is over. As 
soon as another, third person is added, however, the 
situation and its possibilities change markedly, and 
group structures which are separate from and influence 
the individuals involved begin to emerge. Two of the 
people can form a group against the third; one person 
can become the mediator or the object of competition 
between the remaining two, and so on. Simmel saw the 
forms of these interactions as entailing similar options 
and strategies whether one was dealing with room-
mates in college, nation-states, or corporate groups. 
The third is, in general, and in brokerage in particu-
lar, almost all-pervasive but is rarely theorized and 
highlighted as such. Simmel singled out three such pro-
cesses (1992, pp. 124-150), although others have since 
been identified.1 First, a third member may play the 
role of mediator vis-à-vis the other two, helping, 
through his own impartiality, to moderate passions 
that threaten to tear the group apart. There are two 
types of non-partisan thirds: the one who bridges two 
parties—ego and alter—as a non-partisan mediator,2 
and the one who makes a binding decision as an impar-
tial arbitrator (e.g., between employers and unions). 
Second, the third may, alternately, act as a tertius 
gaudens—literally “the third who rejoices”—seeking to 
turn to her advantage a disagreement between the 
other two. In this case we find a configuration of recip-
rocal effects, in which a third party waits and sees and 
                                                          
1 Simmel never claimed that there are only three types of the 
third, and we could certainly think of other types; consider, 
for example, the functions of brokerage which could be as-
sumed by a translator or interpreter or by a scape goat. And 
in his excursus on “the stranger” Simmel not only addressed 
the marginality of the person who exists on the fringes of a 
group, but also describes how the stranger becomes an ele-
ment of the life of the group when its members seek to con-
fide in the stranger. The marginality of the stranger connotes 
a role that is in but not of the group. Thus the stranger can 
have detachment and objectivity and be sought after by the 
group members as an intermediary or as someone who can 
keep secrets (Simmel, 1992, pp. 764-771). 
2 The simplest case of mediation is information flow. This 
does not create direct links between the parties on either 
side. The classical figure is the stock broker. As a result of 
brokerage in the wake of mediation, there is no direct con-
tact between the two actors who are unconnected and for 
which the broker bridges the structural hole. 
eventually draws an advantage out of the rivalry be-
tween ego and alter. Third, through a strategy of divide 
et impera (divide and rule), the third may intentionally 
create conflicts between the other two in order to at-
tain a dominant position. The third rules in subverting 
the potentially more powerful coalition formed by the 
dyad. In doing so, she keeps apart ego and alter in the 
dyad by hierarchizing the relationship. Hierarchization 
of actors with respect to access to material and sym-
bolic resources, social status or power already points to 
the potentially inequality-producing effects of broker-
age. In a nutshell, brokers are not simply nodes in a 
network which bridge two yet unconnected nodes by 
just passing on information, but are parts of social pat-
terns of (in)equalities. Inequalities are differences be-
tween groups of persons which are deemed by at least 
one party as unjust, in this case by the researcher; the 
reverse would be true for equalities. 
In all three types of brokerage mentioned, social in-
equalities are at stake to induce or coerce other parties 
into acting in a certain way. In the first type, the non-
partisan mediator, the third can, by way of going in one 
or another direction, sustain the original power asym-
metry, as is the case between striking immigrant work-
ers and employers (regarding a strike of sans papiers in 
France, see Barron, Bory, Chauvin, Joumin, & Tourette, 
2011). With respect to the second type, it is obvious 
that the focus in terms of advantage shifts to the terti-
us gaudens who gains from observing the two (conflict-
ing) parties who either vie, each individually, for his or 
her attention and support, or have conflicts of interest 
which the third waits to exploit. In the last type, divide 
and rule, the third party actively tries to instigate and 
rule over the two parties, ego and alter. In sum, the 
three types of third discussed by Simmel give us differ-
ent perspectives on the (re)production of inequalities 
with respect to power, but also to resources and status. 
Studying a social mechanism such as brokerage 
makes sense only in a clearly defined context (cf. Falleti 
& Lynch, 2009). In international migration, this context 
is constituted primarily by the following constellation: 
there is a right to exit (one’s country of residence) but 
there is no corresponding right to enter another state.3 
This means that those migrants who get no legal access 
have an incentive to use the services of intermediaries 
who act as liaisons with consulates, traffickers, smug-
glers, recruitment agencies, etc. Needless to say, bro-
kerage extends beyond the initial stage of cross-border 
migration and operates in transnational social spaces. 
A case in point is that of (former) international stu-
dents who not only connect persons in places of origin 
and destination, but sometimes act as intermediaries 
across the globe (Bilecen & Faist, 2014). Brokerage as a 
point of departure helps us to account for the selection 
                                                          
3 This is even true for the largest internal migration system in 
the world, the hukou system in China. 
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of migrants and their mobility, the adaptation of mi-
grants, and the forging and maintaining of cross-border 
ties. So far, most research has related the concept of 
brokerage to very specific aspects—such as electoral 
politics (Koster, 2012), migration and trade (Galemba, 
2012a), patronage relationships (Silverman, 1965), mi-
gration and passage (Spaan, 1994), and development 
cooperation (de Sardan, 2005, pp. 166-167, 173-178), 
to name a few selected examples. More specifically, 
the (historical) literature on brokerage in international 
migration, focusing on the nineteenth-century move-
ment from Europe to the Americas and within Europe—
referencing key terms such as indentured labour, re-
demption system, transit migration, people smuggler, 
etc.—mentions the crucial functions of brokers but usu-
ally does not place brokerage in the broader context of 
political, legal and economic conditions (Moch, 1992; 
but see McKeown, 2008). There is thus a need to arrive 
at a conceptual-typological matrix. 
Not all third parties or those taking over intermedi-
ary functions are defined here as brokers. Silverman 
argues that the functions mediators are concerned 
with must be both critical and exclusive (Silverman, 
1965, p. 173). While critical refers to the notion of di-
rect importance to the basic structures of either or 
both social groups or formations, exclusivity means 
that the link between the social entities must be made 
through the mediators. Thus, the number of roles for 
mediators is limited. Since intermediaries are persons 
who provide contact between two entities or levels but 
do not necessarily fulfil the two above mentioned cri-
teria, Silverman distinguishes between the broader 
category intermediary, and the special type of inter-
mediaries that are mediators. For clarity I use the term 
broker instead of mediator in order to capture broader 
types of function and status, and to distinguish from 
Simmel’s terminology in which mediator is just one 
type of the third. 
Brokerage as a social mechanism needs to be sys-
tematized for two reasons. First, brokerage helps to 
conceptualize the broader infrastructure that makes 
spatial mobility across borders (sometimes also with-
in—for example, China) possible in the first place, as 
well as adaptation and maintaining ties across borders. 
Second, a brokerage perspective helps to break down 
unhelpful dichotomies. Very importantly, we cannot 
assume a priori that migrant and migration networks 
are characterized by altruism and brokerage by profit-
orientation. As previous studies have suggested, profit, 
on the one hand, and trust, on the other hand, “run 
hand-in-hand in between brokers and migrants, and dis-
tinctions between them are often impossible to sustain 
in practice” (Lindquist, Biao, & Yeoh, 2012, p. 9). Going 
further, the analysis helps us to capture empirically the 
processes cutting across state and market, regular and 
irregular, formal and informal boundaries; see, for in-
stance, political brokerage in a slum in Brazil (Koster, 
2012). In this latter example, community leaders in Re-
cife frequently occupy formal positions, such as presi-
dents of grassroots organizations or representatives on 
local consultative bodies, which often contributes to 
their reputation as leaders. Such close intersections be-
tween formal and informal positions have also been ob-
served in the topic studied here, migration brokers 
(Alpes, 2013b, p. 15). The informal practice of brokerage 
is often strongly connected to brokers’ formal positions. 
Brokers who bridge formal and informal positions are to 
be found in numerous contexts. Take the intermediaries 
who act in the function of linking clients and bureaucra-
cies—an example would be political “fixers” in India 
(Reddy & Haragopal, 1985; see also Jaffe, 2013). 
Drawing on examples ranging from nineteenth-
century Europe to twenty-first-century South and 
Southeast Asia, the remainder of this paper sets out to 
explore three questions: (1) How can brokerage be 
conceptualized as a social mechanism and what kind of 
social mechanism is it? (2) Why does brokerage exist? 
(3) What are the implications of different types of bro-
kerage for social inequalities and equalities?  
2. Brokerage as a Social Mechanism and Social 
(In)Equalities 
Since labour migration and other forms of cross-border 
mobility constitute an adaptive response to social risks 
and related inequalities of opportunity on the part of 
the movers, a conceptual approach to brokerage 
should be open to the idea that it can at the same time 
perpetuate old inequalities and create new ones. It 
should also be borne in mind that cross-border mobili-
ty is the outcome of socio-economic, cultural and polit-
ical transformation and related inequalities (e.g. in-
come inequalities between world regions and within 
those regions), which are in some cases even on the in-
crease. While migration is indeed one of the oldest 
means of humankind to combat poverty (Galbraith, 
1979, p. 7), and at the individual or family4 level geo-
graphical mobility may indeed be a successful strategy 
for gaining employment and social protection (Goldin, 
Cameron, & Balarajan, 2011), its consequences may 
                                                          
4 The family, or better, kinship is a type of organization in 
which the third is still specific; reciprocity is general across 
many members who usually know each other and reciprocate 
in various fields – from health care to emotional support. By 
contrast, the state is a type of social organization in which 
the third is specific; reciprocity is thus more specifically 
geared toward selected realms, e.g. the contract between 
generations in certain retirement systems. With respect to 
both family and the state, brokerage can be conceptualized 
at the level of agency but also as a structural feature built in-
to certain types of social organization. As to the relation be-
tween structure and agency, Karl Marx cogently remarked in 
the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, people make their own 
history, but not under conditions of their own choosing. 
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(re)produce inequalities. For example, while family 
members of migrants in the regions of origin may re-
ceive financial remittances, those without kin abroad 
usually do not—and thus the relative distance in in-
come and wealth between the two categories may in-
crease (Lipton, 1980). 
To ask how exactly brokerage works means study-
ing social mechanisms. The term “social mechanism” 
refers to recurring actions and events, and links identi-
fiable initial conditions with specific results; it is a help-
ful concept for identifying processes that generate 
(in)equalities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 24). 
We move from an initial condition I (e.g. the wish to 
migrate across borders, or to adapt to social life in a 
country of destination) to an outcome O (e.g. success-
ful adaptation, such as finding housing, child care, em-
ployment) by way of specifying the processes, that is, 
the mechanism(s) M involved between I and O: I—M—
O. By studying brokerage as a social mechanism we 
contribute substantially to the understanding of the 
(re)production of (in)equalities in social life. After all, 
brokerage may significantly affect the social position 
and life chances of those agents involved. 
Overall, brokerage needs to be disaggregated as a 
social mechanism into sub-mechanisms to be of use. 
This crucial task is nicely illustrated in Pamela Oliver’s 
criticism of the seminal work by McAdams et al. (2001) 
on collective action: 
The mechanism…that comes up most often [in the 
volume] is called “brokerage”, a term borrowed 
from network theory…to refer to people who con-
nect previously unconnected groups, and the book 
stresses its importance in virtually every episode. 
But the nature of this brokerage varies tremen-
dously from case to case. For the Mau Mau, it is a 
semi-planned recruitment strategy that is pretty 
similar to a diffusion process: particular groups are 
recruited and converted, and then sent out as re-
cruiters of others. Taxi-drivers are “brokers” here 
because they meet a lot of people and can thus 
provide communication bridges to new groups. But 
in other situations, e.g., the development of the 
Italian state, the brokers are more in line with the 
usual meaning of the term, people who help parties 
with partially conflicting interests find a mutually 
agreeable bargain. Mediating a bargain over inter-
ests between extant groups and providing a com-
munication link between previously unconnected 
individuals are not the same process, and simply 
calling them both “brokerage” does little to ad-
vance understandings. (Oliver, 2003, pp. 121-122) 
Nonetheless, network methodology is a useful point of 
departure. Along with others, such as exploitation 
(Marx), opportunity hoarding (Tilly, 1998), social clo-
sure (Weber, 1968), or hierarchization (Therborn, 
2006), brokerage is a social mechanism—a sort of so-
cial master mechanism. By and large, brokerage means 
that third parties, that is, brokers, bridge “structural 
holes” (Burt, 1992; see also Gould & Fernandez Rob-
erto, 1989). Such holes exist when there are no direct 
ties between actors (also called “nodes”). In Burt’s un-
derstanding, brokers then act as a third party that ar-
ranges for the connection—in order to facilitate access 
to valued resources, such as travel documents, papers 
to work in another country, civil and social rights, or 
material resources. Brokerage bridges those who are 
not directly connected to each other in a situation 
where the parties are connected to a focal actor—the 
broker—but not to one another.5 Yet the function of a 
broker bridging structural holes is not wide enough to 
understand brokerage in social processes. The two par-
ties may very well know each other. Also, the third, in 
Simmel’s sense, may not be simply a disinterested me-
diator or arbitrator but an involved party, a tertius 
gaudens or a function of divide and rule. Simmel’s ty-
pology offers a broader understanding of different 
constellations of brokerage. 
Brokerage is a tool that helps to account for une-
qual outcomes. Services of a smuggler, a trafficker, or a 
labour recruiter across international borders may come 
at a cost; but not doing so also carries costs, namely of 
missed opportunities for better life chances. Through-
out the nineteenth century, for example, many Indian 
and Chinese labourers signed debt contracts, agreeing 
to repay their transportation costs from wages earned 
in their countries of destination, for example the Unit-
ed States. This kind of indenture could result in rela-
tively voluntary, short-term wage labour, but could al-
so cross over into unfree and bonded labour (Bush, 
2000). Brokerage is also closely connected to what 
could be called modern slavery, such as trafficking 
people to be held in debt bondage. Modern slave own-
ers do not “own” the bodies, which are nowadays con-
sidered disposable (Bales, 1999), and thus do not take 
care of them—as in some forms of slavery in historical 
times.  
Social inequalities here refer to the distribution of 
resources (material and symbolic), social status and 
power considered unjust by one of the parties involved 
                                                          
5 Take the case of two hitherto unconnected actors brought 
together in catalyst brokerage. Through brokerage, the two 
parties on either side of the broker do get to know each oth-
er, the two parties strike up a relationship. This type of bro-
kerage is well known from research on social relations in hir-
ing. Mark Granovetter’s (1973) analysis pointed out the 
importance of “weak ties”, that is, that social ties outside 
one’s immediate frame of social ties (strong ties) can be 
more beneficial in opening up job opportunities. Granovetter 
concluded that strong ties may be too redundant to bring 
new and additional information. Of course, the strength of 
the weak ties phenomenon is predicated on the assumption 
that resources inherent in strong ties are not sufficient. 
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or by the researcher(s). With respect to social 
(in)equalities, two sets of evaluations matter: objective 
evaluations (from the point of view of the researcher) 
as well as subjective perceptions (from the point of 
view of the persons concerned). For migrants the per-
ceptions of (in)equalities regarding resources and sta-
tus could relate to regions of emigration, regions of 
immigration, or both. The units of analysis and of ref-
erence are empirical matters and depend on the ques-
tion(s) asked. These units could be family or kinship 
networks, village or professional. This approach is ap-
propriate because cross-border transactions may take 
place on different levels, such as the family, friendship 
cliques, business networks, local communities, or or-
ganizations, and it is through the very practice itself 
that agents constitute these scales in the first place. 
3. Why Does Brokerage Exist? 
Simmel indicated that one of the characteristics of “the 
third” is the ambiguity of the broker’s role. Brokerage 
involves issues of connectivity between persons and 
groups, as well as trust. Research on international mi-
gration is a prime example of a field in which the im-
portance of brokerage is highlighted because in the 
broadest sense brokerage acts to reduce transaction 
costs, that is, the costs necessary to overcome bounda-
ries. Such boundaries are met along the way through 
the various stages of migration: obtaining a visa to 
cross national borders, crossing borders back and forth 
without a visa (undocumented border-crossing), adapt-
ing to the new country upon arrival—for example by 
finding housing, work, and child care, as well as adapting 
for the longer term. Brokerage operates to bridge di-
vides between newcomers and established groups in the 
place of settlement. Yet brokerage is not only of im-
portance in migration processes from A to B but also in 
processes of return migration, onward movement to yet 
more destinations, or circular mobility across borders.  
It is usually only after brokerage has been provided 
to work abroad that emigration becomes initiated in an 
institutionalized way—going beyond individual and 
small-scale networks (see, for example, Minghuan, 
2012, p. 218; Morawska, 2007). As migration control 
and management have become more sophisticated, 
the demand for brokers is ominpresent at all levels, 
seen, for example, in cases such as the Asia-Pacific mi-
gration systems. This trend is particularly salient for 
large parts of Asia, where a number of researchers 
have noted a dramatic increase in the number of pri-
vate recruitment agencies operating as brokers at the 
centre of a new transnational migration regime (Lind-
quist et al., 2012, p. 8). One may argue that the emer-
gence of “circular migration” at the top of the interna-
tional policy agenda as the management form of the 
future represents an important manifestation of these 
formalization processes (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 12). 
Clearly, in the case of international migration, bro-
kerage may have definite advantages for various par-
ties involved: information and goods travel much faster 
and more smoothly via brokers, and the costs involved 
for migrants may be much lower than through organi-
zational channels proper. Consider the practice of re-
mittances; if a migrant wishes to transf er money from 
Manchester to a village in northwest Pakistan, the 
transaction costs of sending it via Western Union or 
MoneyGram are usually higher than through informal 
networks, such as hawala or hundi—the long-standing 
system of transfer around the Indian Ocean. The trans-
fer involves brokers such as an individual in Manches-
ter, businesspeople in Dubai and intermediaries in Pa-
kistan. Such informal practices, however, can also 
result in unintended negative consequences for mi-
grants (Passas, 1994). This becomes visible, for exam-
ple, when little information is available on the security 
of transfers organized by private individuals. Also, bro-
kerage has been known to result in debt bondage and 
“modern slavery” (O’Connell Davidson, 2013). Broker-
age may thus even be detrimental to the pursuit of a 
better life abroad. Therefore, the very idea that bro-
kerage simply lubricates the machines of cross-border 
mobility may be based on wrong assumptions. For ex-
ample, economists have held that the function of bro-
kers is to bridge information gaps between the demand 
and supply of workers, and once the gap narrows, bro-
kers will tend to disappear to reduce transaction costs. 
However, this is an assumption which does not travel 
very far, since brokerage is not simply a market affair.  
Brokerage cannot be explained simply by the fact 
that official, formal (e.g., state) channels for migration 
need to be lubricated by informal practices. This would 
be an inaccurate description of such brokerage pro-
cesses. First, what migrants usually care about most is 
whether the dream of migration as a strategy to en-
hance life chances can be realized, rather than whether 
the mechanism of cross-border movement is legal or 
not (e.g., Alpes, 2013c, p. 9; Minghuan, 2012, on the 
case of China in historical perspective). Second, mi-
grants care whether brokers operate on a secure for-
mal basis. As studies on local-national mediation in the 
1950s and 1960s showed convincingly, certain local 
wielders of power could act as regional patrons and 
mediators between various levels of government pre-
cisely because they occupied formal positions that 
formed the links between local and national systems 
(Wolf, 1956, on Mexico; Silverman, 1965, p. 180, on Ita-
ly). It was the control of the brokerage function which 
was the primary source for their ability to exert patron-
age, that is, deliver favors to the local populace in ex-
change for resources such as votes at election times. 
We have to look at how international migration is 
really operating. Ever since their inception, modern 
states—for example, in Europe since the sixteenth cen-
tury (cf. Lucassen & Lucassen, 2014)—have sought to 
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rein in mobility across their borders and control it 
tightly. In doing so, states have constantly recreated 
the need for brokerage. Immigration and emigration 
policies create the very “holes” which brokerage is re-
quired to overcome. With respect to migration, border 
control and internal boundaries (e.g. certification in 
certain trades to be eligible to practice) are functions 
of states. Since modern states engage in multiple func-
tions, some of these may be at odds with each other—
and this is why brokerage becomes at times so im-
portant both for migrants trying to navigate the still 
unknown seas of their countries of destination, and for 
states to bridge principles which cannot be reconciled 
on a practical level. For example, brokerage may arise 
at the interstices of the state’s function of asserting 
migration control, on the one hand, and its provision of 
a modicum of social welfare, on the other. There is a 
tension or even dilemma created by these two func-
tions: the state abstains from expelling asylum seekers 
whose requests have been denied, but does not offer a 
secure legalization of their status. At the same time the 
state has to provide shelter for those in need—as evi-
denced in the case of “welfare hotels” in Paris, for ex-
ample. On the one hand, the state is interested in ef-
fective migration control and thus limiting the number 
of those on its territory who have no regular papers; on 
the other hand, the state has some obligation to ob-
serve basic human rights, such as fundamental social 
rights to housing even for those who have no regular 
papers, the sans papiers (de Wenden, 2010). Caught in 
this dilemma, the state, claiming to exert monopoly of 
power over a territory and membership and to be the 
sole legitimate actor in this field, tends to confer au-
thority onto other actors. In this case, state authorities 
may allow civil society organizations to take care of 
persons in need and house them in shelters as they see 
fit (Alpes 2013a). Since migrant families whose request 
for asylum has been denied also face homelessness, 
they are—under certain conditions (that they be single 
mothers with small children)—also admitted. In allow-
ing only single mothers with small children to obtain 
such accommodation, and requiring them to live sepa-
rately from their partners, the state’s control function 
becomes apparent in a second way. The state not only 
controls legal status but also exerts control over social 
and moral behaviour through the intersection of for-
mal practices (e.g. allotment of rooms) and informal 
practices (e.g. brokers deciding on who can receive visi-
tors overnight). In this way, states provide the frames 
for meta-norms, in which specific norms may play out 
on a lower level. 
Nonetheless, states also constantly seek to ensure 
that they are considered the legitimate wielder of 
power over borders. One way is through criminalizing 
other agents active in organizing the crossing of bor-
ders. It is crucial to understand the conditions in which 
states delegitimize certain forms of brokerage. After 
all, states seek to control who is involved in the cross-
ing of boundaries, not only of the state’s physical bor-
ders but also of membership (legal status) which gives 
entitlement to certain civil but above all political and 
social rights (Hollifield, Martin, & Orrenius, 2013). 
States thus try to criminalize certain types of brokers 
but not others. Most often it is the traffickers and 
smugglers who are criminalized. However, much less 
criminalization occurs in areas in which brokers are not 
challenging the monopoly over violence or market reg-
ulation, e.g., in social welfare provision. In their effort 
to delegitimize certain agents not authorized by the 
state, state officials and agencies constitute the mi-
grant as a vulnerable subject who is the victim of un-
scrupulous criminal traffickers. Most instrumental in 
this exercise are not only states but international or-
ganizations, which discovered migration after the end 
of the Cold War as a field to be regulated. In the search 
for new fields of activities, international organizations 
such as the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) have enacted many programs in their fight 
against traffickers in the context of illegal migration 
(Pécoud & Geiger, 2013).  
States have an interest in framing market actors as 
fundamentally different, but in practice there might be 
more parallels than expected (Alpes, 2013a, p. 146): for 
example, the framing of money issues—state authori-
ties demand a “fee”, private agents ask for a “price”—
serves as an instrument of boundary-making between 
state and non-state actors within migration control. 
The disciplinary tactics of constructing mediation by 
state actors as de facto non-mediation and of framing 
monetary flows differently contribute substantially to 
the construction of state practices as supposedly disin-
terested and transparent, while non-state actors are 
sometimes stigmatized as profit-oriented criminals. 
The counter-image to brokerage as illegal is “illegal but 
licit”: though emigration as well as immigration states 
combat smuggling and irregular migration, many mi-
grants and their families see it as a moral act to facili-
tate migration (Sanchez, 2013). We may even think of a 
sort of moral economy of brokerage. This state of af-
fairs has resulted in the creation of dynamic “regimes 
of permissiveness” and thus a thriving migration indus-
try (Kalir & Sur, 2012). It is noteworthy that from the 
perspective of mobile persons and their significant 
others, such as families, there is not necessarily a con-
tradiction between the profit orientation of brokers on 
the one hand and social trust on the other. Still, one 
should not overgeneralize these observations—there 
are many brokerage processes which are devoid of any 
kind of trust, involving truly criminal networks of bro-
kers engaged in the drug trade and other violent illegal 
business activities (see the superb account on crossing 
the Sahara into Italy by Gatti, 2011). 
The criminalization of private brokers by states can 
be traced as far back as the nineteenth century (McKe-
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own, 2012). By the late nineteenth century brokers and 
middlemen began to be increasingly demonized as the 
source of migration troubles encountered by labour 
migrants. In the mass media and government state-
ments alike, brokers then were depicted by less than 
flattering terms such as padrones, crimps, smugglers, 
and coyotes. Immigration laws in general and laws to 
regulate brokers in particular also relegated many of 
the brokerage activities of private agents into the 
realm of illegality. This stigmatization of brokers came 
hand-in-hand with the emerging ideal of the “free” mi-
grant as a self-motivated individual. Brokers were 
thought to interfere with the freedom that was be-
lieved to be the hallmark of a genuine migrant. These 
processes went on, even as brokers found new meth-
ods to assist migrants in negotiating the legal require-
ments. In a way, what was touted as modernization of 
immigration policies, such as an emphasis on able-
bodied labour (human capital) along ethnic and racial 
lines, which acted effectively in exclusionary ways (e.g., 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1881 and US legislation af-
ter World War One), also disconnected nodes and rec-
reated the need for brokerage (cf. Ferguson, 1999, p. 
236). Not surprisingly, the demonization of brokers as 
criminals en tout court continues to draw attention 
away from employers of migrants and broader struc-
tural processes and onto brokers as explanations for 
the inequalities involved in international migration.  
The state’s constitution of legitimate and legal bro-
kerage activity vs. criminal activity as a binary is only 
one constellation. Some civil society actors are not that 
easily criminalized. One example is churches in many 
immigration states who offer sanctuary or “church asy-
lum” to asylum seekers whose claims have been re-
jected by the respective state authorities. In this case, 
secular and church law are at odds with each other. 
This opens up space for brokerage on the part of parish 
communities or congregations, being not of the church 
(and the state) but in it (Lippert, 2005, on Canada). 
Practices of sanctuary are genuine in their enabling ef-
fects, evinced in the way these practices have been 
binding local sanctuary providers together in common 
pragmatic cause. There have been instances in which 
sanctuary has merged the concerns of sanctuary pro-
viders, refugee advocates, and immigration authorities. 
In this case, according to Simmel, brokerage dissolves 
into coalition. 
It is important to note also that states may act as 
brokers themselves. States regulate agents who are in-
volved in organizing access to employment. As we 
know, markets of fictitious commodities such as labour 
are built in no small degree by states themselves, and 
exchange relations function in a context set by state 
authorities, among others (Polanyi, 1944). For exam-
ple, the Philippine state engages in training nurses and 
care workers to be sent abroad. This active role of the 
state does not end with job training but extends—in 
some instances at least—to dealing with legal prob-
lems faced by Filipino/a workers in foreign countries 
(Lindio-McGovern, 2013). Another case in point is Chi-
na (PRC) in the early 1980s (Minghuan, 2012, pp. 214-
215): in the course of cautiously opening up the country 
for emigration a bit after the late 1970s—for example, 
by allowing family members to join others abroad—the 
Chinese state founded a semi-governmental institution; 
later named the International Economic and Technical 
Cooperation Company, or XIETC Company. This compa-
ny held a monopoly on labour brokerage in the province 
of Xiamen until, during the 1990s, the field was taken 
over mostly by private agents—still supervised in the last 
instance by state authorities. 
So far, the analysis has not considered the fact that 
brokerage takes place with various types of actors. 
These can be multinational corporations in the busi-
ness of border control and deportation; agencies and 
companies which facilitate access to legal and illegal 
forms of migration (recruitment agencies which cater 
to the needs of labor markets); clandestine actors 
which include trafficking and smuggling networks 
(which might offer marrying schemes, or collaborate 
with corrupt border agents); and NGOs, humanitarian 
organizations and migrant associations which are some-
times driven by more than just material gain (Gammel-
toft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, 2013). Among these 
different types of brokers, hierarchies can be dis-
cerned. In the Chinese context in the 1990s, for exam-
ple, a three-tiered system seems to have operated: (1) 
a small group of privileged brokers at the top, who 
usually held legal status to stay abroad: they were able 
to issue documents and bribe officials; (2) a middle 
group who often sat in an officially registered company 
in the emigration country: these were mostly institu-
tionalized brokers, authorized to engage in labour ex-
portation; (3) and finally, at the bottom, there were lo-
cals who acted individually, for example by being 
connected to relatives abroad (Minghuan, 2012, p. 
221). How these levels are interrelated is poorly under-
stood; that is, the processes of hierarchization among 
brokers have not yet been sufficiently explored. 
On all these (hierarchical) levels, which intersect 
and interact with state agencies, brokerage often oc-
curs at the interstices of formal and informal practices 
through all stages of the migration process, for exam-
ple, between migrant groups and state bureaucracies. 
There is no formal or informal sector as such, but there 
are formal practices and informal practices, often with-
in a single organization. Moreover, organizations—and 
with respect to administration, the state can also be 
seen as a set of organizations—always provide space 
for informal practices; without such informal practices, 
(formal) organizations would not be able to function.  
Shifting the perspective from the brokers them-
selves to migrants, it should be noted that the type of 
brokerage needed by international migrants depends 
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on legal status (Sredanovic, 2013); for example, mi-
grants in the early stages of immigration in a country of 
destination may need ties to other, pioneer migrants to 
set them up with the basic necessities of life; later on, 
once they have adapted somewhat, they may need ac-
cess to state bureaucracies to legalize their status; in 
this second stage, brokers from support organizations 
in civil society may become essential, e.g. representa-
tives or persons working for unions, churches, or hu-
man rights organizations. 
4. What Are the Implications for Social Inequalities 
and Equalities? 
Official intergovernmental documents often portray 
brokers in a negative way. Brokers are vilified: they al-
legedly distort markets, engage in corruption, and vio-
late and infringe upon human rights (e.g., GCIM, 2005, p. 
70). However, a review of the literature suggests that it 
is usually not clear whether it is the brokers who are in-
strumental in bringing about this outcome, or other par-
ties. Also, the mechanisms by which inequalities are 
produced are not clear. The time is ripe, therefore, to 
generate a typology of types of brokerage and of the 
mechanisms operative within these types. The following 
constitutes a first step toward a typology of brokerage. 
Brokerage constitutes a noteworthy social mecha-
nism because the outcome is ambiguous due to, 
among other things, the broker’s role. Brokerage can 
result in dependency and exploitation but also in in-
creased capacities for the beneficiaries. It is the bro-
ker’s function which makes for complex relations of 
dependency and power asymmetries between the par-
ties involved. Other social mechanisms could also be 
involved, preceding and following brokerage, such as 
social exclusion/inclusion, exploitation/redistribution, 
racialization/affirmative action, etc., since brokers offer 
resources which may enable or hinder spatial, and 
eventually social, mobility, adaptation to new envi-
ronments and the exchange of ideas.  
Though there are many types of brokers imagina-
ble, I restrict the typology to three—two classical ones 
derived from Simmel, and an additional one—partisan 
arbitrator (Table 1). I do not discuss Simmel’s first type 
of “the third”, namely the non-partisan mediator and 
arbitrator. The non-partisan who tries to mediate (or 
even bindingly arbitrate) serves the whole. Yet that 
type does not seem to be visible in migration broker-
age. Instead, I discuss partisan arbitration or even ad-
vocacy. Brokerage in migration is usually partisan, 
seeking to serve the role of migrants, or the state, and 
the brokers themselves. Therefore, it can be called a 
limiting case because Simmel is quite right in arguing 
that the partisanship of the third—if it leads the two 
original parties to collude and form a dyad—is the end 
of brokerage. However, in areas such as international 
migration, advocates who act as brokers may take 
sides but, as we have already encountered in the case 
of NGOs, still maintain their relations with the other 
party, such as the state. Consider, for example, NGOs 
who engage in delivering services to new immigrants. 
Such NGOs side with immigrants but are often finan-
cially dependent on state agencies. And even if that 
does not apply, they need to entertain channels of 
communication with state agencies to effectively serve 
their newcomer clients. 
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4.1. Partisan Arbitration  
While states themselves may act as brokers, and while 
states often cast private actors as illegal arbitrators, 
there are civil society actors, such as NGOs, who dis-
play legitimate social and humanitarian justifications 
for their participation in the migration industry, in par-
ticular what has been called the “rescue industry” 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, 2013). Such 
NGOs, which may be active with respect to interna-
tional refugees, base their activities and practices on 
human rights. In doing so, they add a third dimension, 
namely solidarity, to the control and monopoly power 
sought by the state, and facilitation promised by pri-
vate, commercially-oriented agents.  
At the level of civil society, solidarity functions as 
the main mechanism underlying this type of brokerage. 
This is evidenced, for example, when social movement 
groups provide space for issues to be deliberated in the 
public sphere, such as the initiative “No more deaths 
on the border”, which has been operative in Arizona for 
the past ten years (Feldman, 2013). This movement has 
raised attention to the deleterious effects of increased 
securitization on the Mexican−US border; not only ef-
fecting border-crossers but also for those living in the 
borderlands. One may even think of this initiative as a 
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kind of brokerage between migrants and the border 
population on the one hand, which both suffer from 
transgressive border guard practices, and the political 
system on the other. In this way it is not simply a case 
of advocacy but also a sign of solidarity with migrants.  
Historically, there were numerous civil society asso-
ciations active in the US dealing with immigrants in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On Ellis 
Island, voluntary organizations such as St. Raphael’s 
Society, the Society for the Protection of Italian Immi-
grants, and the Women’s Home Missionary Society 
took care of immigrants fresh off the boat. They helped 
them with the official procedures and offered services 
for adapting to the new environment. All these organi-
zations were required to have official legitimation for 
their activities by federal state authorities. Again, as in 
the case of the “welfare hotels” mentioned before, 
brokerage thus arose at the interstices of the function 
of the state for migration control, on the one hand, and 
ensuring a modicum of social welfare, on the other. 
The state was a crucial actor conferring authority to 
other actors; in this case, civil society organizations. 
A case in point for solidarity on the part of charita-
ble organizations, and in this particular case one which 
formed out of the immigration experience, is the He-
brew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) in New York. As one 
historian described HIAS’ activities in the early twenti-
eth century: 
The activities of HIAS workers suggest how such 
ethnic societies served their own. Men and women 
wearing blue caps embroidered with the letters HI-
AS in Yiddish met the ferryboats landing at Ellis Is-
land. They distributed to Jewish immigrants infor-
mation sheets printed in Yiddish which explained 
the inspection procedures. They eased the fears of 
the anxious with warm smiles and advice on how to 
answer questions….Should one lie or tell the truth? 
Should one claim poverty or show one’s money? 
Would the immigrant inspectors expect bribes such 
as those Russian officials had demanded? Society 
agents urged the immigrants to be honest and inter-
ceded with immigration officials so that the nervous, 
confused immigrant might have adequate opportuni-
ty to provide the correct information….Newspapers 
would be brought by HIAS workers to Ellis Island on 
the ferry and all-night staff members would work to 
match each immigrant to a job advertisement. 
(Kraut, 1982, pp. 61-62) 
There are also indirect consequences of the practices of 
civil society actors which can be classified as brokerage: 
in the Netherlands, for example, for two decades single 
and divorced Dutch fathers and EU citizens mobilized 
human rights law to reunite with their children. Eventu-
ally, not only did they benefit from the successful mo-
bilization of European human rights law, but so also did 
single and divorced mothers from outside the EU who 
did not hold Dutch citizenship (Van Walsum, 2009). This 
case already suggests that brokerage is to be understood 
not only in the sense of agency—although it is of the 
agents’ making—but also as a structural feature: the 
gains made by more powerful actors filtered down to less 
powerful ones via the practices of law. We can speak of a 
diffusion effect. Like solidarity, this is not an inequality-
producing but an equality-generating mechanism. 
The boundaries between partisan arbitrage in civil 
society and in large kinship networks are fluid: since 
families or kinship groups more generally are based 
primarily on the mechanism of generalized reciprocity, 
brokerage is also built into this mechanism. Nonethe-
less, nuclear families at least cannot really be seen as a 
brokerage system—close ties tend to yield too much 
redundant information (cf. Granovetter, 1973). Yet 
wider kinship systems could be a limiting case. An ex-
ample is the interaction of state visa systems with kin-
ship reciprocities in providing access to visas in Gambia 
for young men of Soninke ethnic groups (Gaibazzi, 
2013). There are two crucial parameters involved in 
providing their access to visas. First, there is the family 
group in which relatives, mostly the elders, decide 
which of the young men are bound for Europe. The link 
is usually a relative who has already settled in a Euro-
pean country. Family relations are decisive; for exam-
ple, solidarity tends to be higher among children of the 
same father and mother than of the same father and a 
different mother. Second, relatives usually also facili-
tate access to intermediaries in the migration industry 
who help potential migrants obtain legal documents, 
such as a passport or a birth certificate. 
4.2. Tertius Gaudens 
Formally speaking, the specific constellation of tertius 
gaudens means that there is a divergence of interest of 
two elements (actors) out of which the third draws an 
advantage. This does not mean that there is an open 
conflict between these two elements, only that there is 
a sort of perceived difference between the two (Sim-
mel, 1992, pp. 139-140). Such differences between two 
parties may be logics of action which exclude each oth-
er. A historical example dating back to the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries is that of the state 
of Prussia in recruiting agricultural labour, in which po-
litical and economic interests were in tension. Political-
ly, the recruitment of such labour in Eastern Europe 
constituted a security risk in the eyes of the Prussian 
authorities. Yet, economically, such migrant labour was 
sought after by the agricultural-military elites who 
served as the political backbone of the Prussian state, 
among them the Junkers. The state itself became a 
broker through a central agency, the so-called Feldar-
beiterzentrale, instituted in 1907. Increased state con-
trol notwithstanding, the agency cooperated with pri-
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vate recruiters in Eastern Europe. 
In order to benefit from his or her position, the ter-
tius gaudens does not need to be much more powerful 
than the two other parties. His or her ability to derive 
advantages is determined by the constellation of pow-
er among the two remaining agents (Simmel, 1992, p. 
137). It is decisive that the support of one of the two 
parties by the broker tips the the scales in either way. 
To take an example from historical migration research, 
commercially active private agents instigated labourers 
(Preußengänger) to breach their contracts, as a way to 
derive premiums twice since the agent could hold re-
cruiters accountable. On the other hand, the private 
agents cooperated with agricultural employers by 
keeping part of the wages in order to avoid breaches of 
contract. As a crucial prerequisite to playing it both 
ways the brokers need to speak the “language” of both 
sides, such as—in development contexts—between the 
target population and the development institutions, 
speaking the languages not only literally but also with 
respect to moral, ideological and other significant fea-
tures (de Sardan, 2005, on “development brokers”). 
The advantaged position of the tertius gaudens dis-
appears at the moment the two other parties form a 
unit, that is, the constellation of three (the triad) re-
verts into a dyad. Such a development may occur with-
out a fusion of interests in that the object of strife 
simply disappears (Simmel, 1992, p. 141). A case in 
point is the right of entry into another state, which is 
an extension of the right to exit. This rare right was 
achieved, for example, in the early 2000s by the east-
ward expansion of the European Union (EU). There was 
simply no need for migration brokerage anymore. 
The implications of tertius gaudens for social ine-
qualities can be studied fruitfully in the case of labour 
management, which deals with the control of labour in 
the workplace and beyond. International migration in a 
global context then raises the question how various 
sorts of labour can be managed. Biao (2007) studied 
the global IT market with a specific focus on what are 
termed skilled workers from India (e.g., software engi-
neers) and on specific kinds of recruitment agencies 
called “body shops”. These agencies recruit IT workers 
as project-based labour, mainly from India. The body 
shops manage workers on behalf of employers, and are 
sometimes employers themselves, and thus offer ser-
vices which range from sponsoring workers’ temporary 
work visas to paying their salaries and arranging for ac-
commodation. One may interpret Biao’s case study as 
including at least two sets of overlapping brokerage: 
body shops act as the broker between employers and 
workers (e.g., wages, terms of engagement), and be-
tween employers and states (e.g., visa). It is thus a set 
of relationships involving four major parties, the body 
shops, the employers, the workers and the state au-
thorities. 
Since body shops as brokers ensure that workers 
and employers do not enter into any direct relation-
ships, employees can be retrenched at any time. These 
migrant workers thus carry the brunt of the costs and 
the risks (see Kuptsch, 2006, on “merchants of labour” 
more generally). Body shop operators either place IT 
workers out to another employer, or put them on the 
bench to await further placement. The main instru-
ment here is called “benching”, which makes sure that 
a flexible labour market can be institutionalized and 
maintained (Biao, 2007, p. 22). In a nutshell, body 
shops externalize costs to workers so that there is not 
only no negative impact on the employer in the supply 
of workers but what is more, there is a ready supply of 
docile workers. In addition, benching also helps to 
handle labour management free from obligations un-
der labour laws, which eases exploitation of workers by 
employers. Inequalities among the workers, in turn, at 
the surface, run along lines of ethnicity; for example, 
employers in the US put workers to certain tasks for 
the very fact that they are Indian. Yet the ethnicization 
of body shopping has little to do with ethnicity as it is 
usually understood, since Indians of multiple religious 
backgrounds (Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, etc.) are treated 
the same by body shop operators. Instead, the ethnici-
zation of workers enables body-shop operators to get 
around state regulations by appealing to the workers’ 
complicity and to ensure compliance from the workers 
whose visas they sponsored (Biao, 2007, pp. 7-8). Fur-
thermore, entrepreneur-aspiring IT workers often use 
body shopping as an entry point for acting as suba-
gents and eventually become body shop operators 
themselves. In so doing, body shopping as a business 
using ethnicity as a heterogeneity relevant for inequali-
ties is further reproduced. The concepts of individuali-
zation and professionalism deployed by Indian IT work-
ers contribute to the justification of hierarchic 
differentiation among workers with respect to re-
numeration and working conditions as natural. Individ-
ualization justifies hierarchies among workers, based 
on the assumption—shared by the workers—that suc-
cess depends solely on merit. Very importantly, this 
helps to ensure body shops’ control over IT workers. 
Going beyond the brokerage relationships and 
viewing these processes in a transnational perspective, 
the low-tier informal sector effectively siphons off local 
resources in India, embodied in the labour force, and in 
so doing provides not only cheap and skilled labour to 
the overseas sector, but also delivers, when small play-
ers move up, finance capital to the higher sector in In-
dia and destination countries such as the US, Australia 
and the UK (Biao, 2007, p. 112). Transnationalization 
allows not only for new cross-border links of capital 
and transfer of wealth but also makes possible the re-
production of social inequalities. The “war for IT talent” 
can only be waged because there is a huge supply of 
willing IT labour in India; this in itself may not be prob-
lematic, as there may be circulation of labour—thus 
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brain drain is also partly brain circulation. However, in-
vestments come from below, made by IT workers who 
become entrepreneurs not only of themselves but of 
others, and these investments are for the most part 
made not in India but abroad in the US, Australia, the 
UK, etc. These patterns help to recreate inequalities 
between the regions involved.  
When viewed in comparative perspective, the sys-
tem of body shopping stands—with respect to its ef-
fects on social inequalities between workers and em-
ployers and among workers—somewhere in between 
the guest-worker system of Europe in the 1960s at one 
end of the spectrum and project workers and contract 
labourers in the Middle East on the other end. In Eu-
rope, guest workers were employed on nominally the 
same social rights basis as non-migrant labour with re-
spect to unemployment insurance, health insurance 
and pensions, albeit in 3D positions (“dirty, dangerous, 
demeaning”). This constellation allowed for a rough le-
gal parity between native and immigrant workers with 
respect to socio-economic rights. In contract and pro-
ject-tied work for so-called low-skilled labour traveling 
on the migration highways from, for example, South 
Asia to the Middle Eastern Gulf states, there are re-
ports of abuse (ILO, 2012). Clearly, project-based and 
contract labour in many Middle Eastern countries de-
pend on the legal disadvantages of migrant workers 
vis-à-vis the native workforce which is sometimes even 
in the minority, numerically speaking. As is well docu-
mented, the differences in legal status also translate 
into inferior working conditions (Abella, 1995). In short, 
from the point of view of immigrant workers, the hier-
archy of preference with respect to legal status would 
be thus: at the top is the guest worker system of Eu-
rope in the 1960s and 1970s, in the middle the global-
ized system of body shops operating out of India since 
the 1990s, and at the bottom the project-tied labour 
schemes in the Middle East.  
Entire local communities engage in brokerage and, 
at first glance, enjoy the status as a collective tertius 
gaudens. Nonetheless, not all community members 
benefit equally. Rebecca Galemba describes how resi-
dents living on the Mexico-Guatemala border strategi-
cally use their location at a clandestine border-crossing 
road to make ‘business’ (Galemba, 2012a). Since the 
late 1990s, residents have been successful in prohibit-
ing the entrance of state officials to the extent that the 
road is now considered to be “free”. The Zapatista up-
rising in the Chiapas region in 1994, other peasant and 
social movements, and the increasing presence of 
gangs and cartels reinforced views on the part of the 
Mexican state that the social, political, physical and fi-
nancial costs of patrolling the border outweighed the 
predicted amounts of contraband. Since migrant or 
borderland networks as such cannot explain how peo-
ple and goods are moved, Galemba “focuses on cross-
border intermediaries and smugglers, truckers, and the 
smaller-scale extra-legal activities of residents who 
struggle to maintain their livelihoods in a local economy 
revolving around contraband” (Galemba, 2012a, p. 3).  
Two categorizations matter with respect to inequal-
ities: First, there are those who participate in the con-
traband economy and those who do not. Galemba fur-
nishes some evidence to the effect that the former 
tend to be privileged vis-à-vis the latter. Second, those 
who do take part in the contraband economy benefit 
unequally. A case in point is that the contraband econ-
omy exacerbates existing class hierarchies. For example, 
while Tito, one of Galemba’s main informants, often 
helps poor family members and provides employment, 
residents know and understand that the majority of re-
sources and networks are concentrated within his nu-
clear family. Moreover, Tito’s children enjoy material 
advantages that prepare them for later success in not 
only illegal activities but also in the formal economy, 
because they are able to attend above-average high 
schools and universities (Galemba, 2012b, p. 12). This 
is a typical case of the social mechanism of opportunity 
hoarding. It is a form of social closure in the sense of 
privilege as a means to increase the opportunities for 
one’s own group, be it based on ethnic, religious, kin-
ship, professional or other grounds (Tilly, 1998, pp. 
147-169). This finding indicates that the extra-legal 
economic practices sharpen and legitimize class differ-
ences between residents. It does not question but rein-
forces social inequalities by weaving together drivers of 
trucks; border middlemen who organize the transport 
of goods such as corn, sugar and coffee from Guatema-
la to Mexico and cement blocks in the opposite direc-
tion; and larger-scale smugglers. 
Indeed, the very social embeddedness of economic 
practices at the border in community and kinship ties 
and in formal economic activities makes it hard to 
maintain rigid distinctions between legal and illegal, at 
least from the point of view of the residents involved. 
Also, it provides key capacities to those who have oth-
erwise little access to employment (cf. Nordstrom, 
2007). By implication, it is impossible to maintain the 
allegedly clear-cut distinction between altruism and 
profit orientation. Altruism in the form of patronage is 
one of the main foundations for contraband to yield 
profit. For example, the patron is expected to cover un-
expected costs arising from contraband, such as medical 
expenses. This means that altruism is an ambiguous 
mechanism: it may help to entrench inequalities be-
tween those participating in contraband, but may also 
empower the recipients to improve their life chances.  
Over the years, the perceptions of legal/illegal and 
honest/dishonest distinctions have changed, however. 
The clandestine road connecting Frontera Comalapa, 
Mexico, and La Democracia, Guatemala, increasingly 
became a hub for the cocaine trade, whereby some 
residents became suspicious of what seemed like mid-
dlemen’s “all-of-a-sudden earnings”. In this context, 
 Social Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 4, Pages 38-52 49 
Galemba argues that “under circumstances of increas-
ing inequality and secrecy, local terminologies are shift-
ing from ‘work’ and ‘honest business’ to ‘contraband’ 
and ‘smuggling’” (Galemba 2012b, p. 14). 
4.3. Divide et Impera 
It is obvious that in divide and rule the broker splits ego 
and alter on purpose in order to reap the benefits. S/he 
can do so by sowing mistrust or envy. As mentioned 
above, states themselves may act as divide and rule 
brokers, and they may do so in colluding with certain 
types of migrant labour brokers. In the East Asian case, 
Chinese state agencies directly structure markets for 
intermediaries (Biao, 2013). For example, when the 
Chinese state got out of the business of directly linking 
workers and foreign employers, as in the case of em-
ployers in Japan, it conferred primary agency to inter-
mediaries both upstream and downstream. The result 
was, among others, a downward allocation of liability 
to the individual migrant—a clear case of hierarchiza-
tion of control and thus power. Thus, in a group of mi-
grants, the private agents punish all involved if one 
worker misbehaves; then all are threatened with re-
turn to China. Such tight social control of migrants ne-
cessitates a constant search for new sources in order to 
avoid networks of migrants who might try to escape 
the cage. Migration brokers benefitted from capitaliz-
ing on would-be migrants’ instrumentalist agendas and 
the latter’s faith in the central state for their ultimate 
security. The cost for the intermediaries was to experi-
ence blame and punishment, rightly or wrongly, when-
ever the state regarded it as necessary. In a way, one 
could interpret this case as one of dual brokerage: both 
the Chinese state and brokers in China benefit from 
their control over both workers and brokers further 
down the ladder who are closer to the workers. 
Brokers may not only benefit from tensions and 
maintain them, as in the tertius gaudens type, but con-
sciously create tensions between the two other parties 
on purpose. A case in point is middlemen in the used-
car business in Cotonou. These démarcheurs in second-
hand car markets try to prevent buyers and sellers 
from creating dependable market relations by skillfully 
manipulating information to their own advantage 
(Beuving, 2013, p. 3). Contrary to a common under-
standing of brokerage, Beuving’s case study illustrates 
that démarcheurs do not corroborate economic func-
tionality in the sense of easing information flows be-
tween buyers and sellers: “Hence, in Cotonou there 
appears to be a need for dependable market infor-
mation, but at the same time it is impossible to get it. It 
will be shown how démarcheurs capitalize on this am-
bivalence and in this way carve out a niche in the mar-
ket for themselves” (Beuving, 2013, p. 4). Beuving 
shows further how these intermediaries try to create 
discontinuities by preventing buyers and sellers from 
creating dependable market relations, and by skillfully 
manipulating information to their own advantage. In 
short, brokers make information scarce, which is rather 
paradoxical because the information these brokers try 
to make scarce is exactly what they need themselves to 
do business. Brokers increase transaction costs be-
tween buyers and sellers of cars by threatening re-
venge: sellers may face negative repercussions if they 
do not involve the démarcheurs, e.g. demolition of cars 
during the night (Beuving, 2013, p. 12). The main point 
is that the démarcheurs seek to create a “nuisance val-
ue” by impacting upon car sellers so that the latter sur-
render and collaborate in sharing the profit with the 
brokers. Overall, it is a case of brokers dominating buy-
ers and sellers. 
To understand that brokers are not necessarily the 
most powerful party in a triad and are in fact quite vul-
nerable at times, one has only to think of what have 
been called middleman minorities. At the height of Eu-
ropean colonialism, it was the colonial powers who 
used brokers as a means to divide and rule over colo-
nized peoples, mainly in Africa and Asia. Well-known 
examples of these middleman minorities are South 
Asians who were employed by the British colonial 
power in East or South Africa as employees in the local 
administration. Middleman minorities have occupied 
niches which were unattractive to local entrepre-
neurs—the Chinese in California, Australia, and Canada 
in the second half of the nineteenth century who spe-
cialized in trades such as laundry shops, tobacco shops 
and other services, or Indian bureaucrats in African 
states such as Uganda, brought in by the British coloni-
al authorities during the nineteenth century. Middle-
man minorities fulfilled specific functions not only eco-
nomically, such as servicing unattractive niches in 
service markets, but also politically, for example, by 
staffing the colonial administrations. In this capacity 
there were always doubts about whether they could be 
trusted (Bonacich, 1973). After all, middleman minori-
ties conceived of themselves not as immigrants but as 
sojourners, that is, temporary residents. And when set-
tlement became more or less permanent, they contin-
ued to bear the status of aliens. This also meant exclu-
sion from the political system—at the very least from 
the formal channels of political claim-making and au-
thority. The vulnerable role of brokers could be seen in 
the Chinese Exclusion Act in the US which effectively 
blocked regularized channels of Chinese migration 
from the early 1880s until the 1940s. The example of 
the mass expulsion of persons of Indian descent under 
the dictatorship of Idi Amin in Uganda during the 1970s 
suggests that their (former) intermediary position be-
tween the autochthonous groups and the colonial 
power made them easy targets for scapegoating. 
Although power as a source of social inequalities is 
by no means restricted to the formal political realm of 
electoral policies and bureaucratic policies, political 
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brokerage is a primary illustration of brokers’ vulnera-
bilities. While middleman minorities are, as ethnic mi-
norities, an obvious target for cultural, political and 
economic exclusion, there are also more hidden forms 
of vulnerability among brokers. In a case study on polit-
ical brokerage as a complex, provisional and contested 
phenomenon in a Recife slum in Brazil, Koster (2012, p. 
480) shows that brokers have to deal with the distinct 
interests of patrons and clients, as well as with the di-
verging and ambivalent views the latter have of elec-
toral politics, the patrons and the brokers. Clearly, po-
litical brokerage has been a persistent feature of the 
workings of Brazilian politics in distributing valued 
goods in exchange for political support in the form of 
votes. Clientelist politics explain the existence of bro-
kers by the benefits they bring for clients, patrons and 
for the brokers themselves. It is important to note, 
however, that the brokers’ position not only implies 
power, as they set the terms for exchanges, but also 
vulnerability. Mediating between voters and party 
bosses, for example, brokers risk losing the confidence 
of their patrons and their clients if they work for sever-
al patrons (Koster, 2012, p. 482). 
5. Conclusion 
By employing brokerage as a social mechanism, we can 
see that it is a crucial part of the functioning of what 
are called migrant or migration networks, groups and 
associations. The ubiquitous reference of migration re-
search to migrant or migration networks as an answer 
to account for the dynamics of migration and for con-
sequences such as the reproduction of old and the 
production of new (in)equalities is superficial. Instead, 
the brokerage mechanism indeed provides insight into 
a range of options and alternatives otherwise unseen. 
In particular, a focus on brokerage allows us to see the 
constraining and enabling forces and agents’ efforts to 
deal with them. This is true not only for migrants in-
volved in geographical and social mobility but, thinking 
reflexively, also for social scientists who analyse bro-
kerage. When analysing concrete cases, the typology 
with the three types of brokerage—partisan arbitra-
tion, tertius gaudens and divide et impera yields a cou-
ple of typical sub-mechanisms which are operative in 
brokerage and relevant for the production of 
(in)equalities. Of the three types of brokerage dis-
cussed, partisan arbitration carries the highest poten-
tial for producing equalities instead of inequalities. This 
outcome is contingent on clear advocacy along norms 
of equality. Yet one should be careful equating partisan 
arbitration solely with equality-producing effects since 
unintended effects abound. For example, migrant ad-
vocacy organizations are necessarily selective in which 
categories of migrants they support. The question thus 
is rather “Equality for whom?” 
What needs to be fleshed out in future work is how 
brokerage as a social mechanism operates in different 
contexts, synchronically (across states or organizations) 
and diachronically (across historical epochs). Histories 
of migration have convincingly shown the different 
forms long-distance migration has taken over the cen-
turies. Questions arise, such as: did the invention of 
strict border controls in the 19th century and the ex-
pansion of brokerage in international migration go 
hand in hand? How do the Atlantic, Pacific or even 
Asian/Siberian migration systems of the nineteenth 
century differ from contemporary movements, and 
what are the consequences for the operation of bro-
kerage? And what are the structural differences across 
different types of mobility for brokerage—such as 
movement of international students, expatriates, post-
ed workers, tourists, classical labour migration, forced 
migration, or circular migration? Such an analysis will 
certainly provide more sub-mechanisms conducive for 
the (re)production of (in)equalities and, above all, an 
opportunity for a taxonomy of brokerage.  
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